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INTRODUCTION

Determining when plaintiffs can recover monetarily for emotional distress has been a
question nationwide. Recovery for emotional distress has been addressed in many situations for
victims and bystanders. However, recovery for emotional distress has usually been linked to a
physical manifestation or injury. Many courts have yet to address whether an individual suffering
from the fear of contracting cancer can recover. New Mexico, unlike Colorado, has yet to
encounter such a case.

P.

Over the past five decades toxic contamination from chemical releases, whether negligent
or intentional, has affected many people in numerous ways. Chemicals can migrate via water and
air, contaminating soil, drinking water, and the air. The Love canal' is one of the first and one of

' In the late 18001s,W.T. Love excavated for a proposed hydroelectric power project, which was

never implemented. The site of excavation became known as the Love Canal. In 1942, the Hooker
chemical Company, now Occidental Chemical Corporation (OCC), used the site as a landfill and
dumped over 21,000 tons of chemical wastes in the landfill. The chemicals included pesticides and
chlorobenzenes. In 1952, Hooker Chemical Company stopped using the site as a landfill. A year
later the site was covered and the property deeded to the Niagara Falls Board of Education. The
area was extensively developed. Approximately ten years later, the residents noticed odors and
residues, the intensity of which increased by the 1970's. The toxic chemicals had migrated to the
surrounding area and into the Niagara River. After two emergency declarations by President
Carter, 950 families were evacuated from the area. The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) purchased the properties and oversaw the relocation activities. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Region 2 Supetfund: Love Canal, available at
http://www.epa.gove/region02/superfund~np1/0201290c.htm
(last visited July 21,2002). In 1979,
the United States filed an action against OCC, the City of Niagara Falls, the Board of Education of
the City of Niagara Falls, and the Niagam County Health Department to ensure complete relief.

the most infamous incidents of toxic contamination which brought to light the far-reaching impact
\-'/

:

chemical releases have on nearby communities. The Rocky Mountain States, and in particular,
New Mexiw, have had very few, if any, tort cases resulting from toxic pollutants. In New Mexiw,
the two most recent cases that have resulted from a toxic release, Schwartzmn Inc. v. Atchison,
Topeka & S.F. ~ a i ~ w ~and
l y :Hartman v. Temco ~nc.,'address the torts of trespass and nuisance,

but not personal injury and the emotional distress the people living near the sites of chemical
release can suffer from.
Dodge v. Cotter

or^.,^ is the most recent case in the Rocky Mountain States that

addresses personal injuries resulting from a toxic chemical release. The Rocky Mountain States
have a diverse climate that has attracted a wide variety of industries including the Waste Isolation
Pilot project,' Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories, Intel, and other large manufacturers.
These industries employ thousands of people who live, work, and vacation nearby. With the influx
n
f,

of these industries and people, it is reasonable to assume that we will see claims similar to those in
Dodge filed and litigated in the New Mexiw State and federal courts.

-

Four months later the State of New York and UDGLove Canal. Inc.. filed claims against OCC. In
response to the litigation, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act was passed in 1984. Litigation regarding the disaster at the Love Canal continued
A ~ t a i 'Right
s
to Recover Punitive Damages in a
until the early 1990's. Hernan, ~obert-~mmet,
Public Nuisance Action: The Love Canal Case Shrdy, 1 Touro Environmental L. Journal. 1994,
available at http://www.tourolaw.edu~PublicationslEnvironmental/vol/part3.html
(last visited
July 21,2002).

123 N.M. 220,937 P.2d 979 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
Dodge v. Cotter Cop., 203 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2000).

-

The Waste Isolation Pilot Project, also known as WIPP,is an underground repository for
transuranic radioactive waste. WIPP is located in southeastern New Mexico, 26 miles Southeast
of Carlsbad, New Mexico. United States Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, WIPP,
available at http://www.wipp.carlsbad.nm.us/index.htm (last visited May 29,2002).

IL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Cotter Corporation operated a uranium mill near Canon City, Colorado from 1958 to
1987.~The milling process extracted uranium from ore and produced two types of waste.' The
waste products from the Cotter mill were released into the groundwater and the atmosphere and
eventually contaminated an area approximately four miles in radius from the mill site including
the nearby town of Lincoln Park. Subsequently, the area was designated as a ~u~erfund'
site. In
1983 the State of Colorado sued ~ o t t e ?for continually violating the conditions of its operating
license and for cleanup of the c~ntamination.'~
The State and Cotter entered into a consent decree.
The decree established a panel to quantify exposures from the mill contaminants. The panel
determined that possible health risks were low with the exception of exposure from the drinking
,I?

water."

7

The two types of waste were dust-like particulates of ore and liquid, which are recovered from
the uranium extraction process. The liquid waste was stored in unlined ponds, which allowed the
waste to leach into the groundwater. Id. at 1192.

'Congress established "the Superfund Program in 1980to locate, investigate, and clean up the

worst [uncontrolledand hazardous waste] sites nationwide. The EPA administers the Superfund
program in cooperation with individual states and tribal governments. The office that oversees
management of the program is the Office of Emergency and Remedial Response (OERR)."
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund, available at
http:Nwww.epa.govlsuperfund/about.htm(last visited March 27,2002).
~ o d ~203
e ,F.3d at 1194 citing State ofColorado v. Cotter Corp., No. 83-C-2389 (1983).
lo id.

at 1193.

1d. at 1193.
3-',

Approximately five hundred residents of Lincoln Park and three other nearby towns
A

brought an action in 1989 against the Cotter Corporation. The plaintiffs asserted that negligent
operation of the mill caused damage to their health, including a fear of contracting cancer, and
. .
property damage.12The plaintiffs requested damages exceeding $350 million,1 3 lqunctive
relief

and medical monitoring.'4 The 1989 suit alleged violation of the Comprehensive Environmental

' ~ Colorado
Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)," the Price Anderson ~ c t ,and
law." Five hundred plaintiffs filed a class action suit,'' but were denied class status.l9 A set of

l2 Id. at 1192. The plaintiffs list gout, bony growths, arthritis, cataracts, and genetic damage as
some of the illnesses that they allege were caused by exposure to the radioactive contaminants
fiom the mill. A 70% decrease in property value and a market value of zero is claimed by the
plaintiffs. Appellee's Answering BrieVCross-Appellants' Opening Brief at pg. 5.

l3 The damages sought were for Cotter's

negligence, strict liability, nuisance, willful and wanton
conduct, outrageous conduct, trespass, and absolute liability. Dodge, 203 F.3d 1194.

" 42 USC

$59601-9675 (2000). This law created a tax and broad authority for the federal
government to reswnd to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances from the
chemical and petrAleum industries that may endanger the environment or the public. It established
requirements for waste sites, provided for liability, and established a trust fund when a responsible
could not be found. This law also providesfor both short-term and long-term solutions to
remediation of Superfund sites. See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund
CERCLA Overview, available at h t t p : / / w w w . e p a . g o v / s u p e ~ d / a c t i o n / l a w(last
/ ~ visited
March 27,2002).
42 USC 52210(n)(2). The Price-Anderson Act is an amendment to the 1946 Atomic Energy Act.
This amendment limited the liability of the corporations licensed under the Atomic Energy
Commission (established by the Atomic Energy Act) to the amount available from private sources.
In Re T M Litigation, 193 F.3d 613,624 n.7.
l6

l7 Plaintiff alleged negligence, trespass, and nuisance under Colorado law. Boughton v. Cotter
Corporation, 65 F.3d 823,825 (10th Cir. 1995).

The plaintiffs filed for class action status under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23, but were
denied on three separate occasions. Id at 828.
19

I?.

The trial judge did not address whether Rule 23(b)(lXA) would apply, but ruled that the class
did not prove that the plaintiffs would be satisfied from a limited fund under Rule 23@)(1)(B).

bellwether plaintiffs was chosen and proceeded with the lawsuit knowing that the remaining
A

individuals would follow with subsequent trials.20
Eight plaintiffs (Boughton plaintiffs) were selected for the iirst trial (Boughton v. Cotter

or^.^'). The Boughton plaintiffs listed eleven negligent acts and/or omissions in the
These plaintiffs did not have present personal injuries but sought damages in an action alleging
negligence for medical monitoring, and damages for trespass and nuisance for failure to properly
controVwntain the hazardous materials from the

Cotter admitted that its operation caused

some contamination in limited areas, but denied that it breached any legal standard of

The

jury returned a special verdict form "for each plaintiff ... for medical monitoring, trespass, and
nuisance."25The jury did not find that there was exposure to hazardous materials making it

n

The court also stated that it was not proper to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2) because the
relief sought was primarily monetary. Boughton, 65 F.3d at 827. The trial judge found that the
plaintiffs' action for damages failed to meet the statutory requirements under Rule 23(b)(3)
because the individual issues predominated over the common issues. Boughton, 65 F.3d at 826.
The individual issues included awareness of contamination, the extent and nature of their injuries,
the amount of exposure, the amount of contamination and water right ownership. Id. The proposed
class was defined by the geographic region in which the plaintiffs lived and worked during a
specified time. Id. at 828. The district courtjudge stated class action status wuld not be
maintained because "it could not be shown that the claims of the proposed class members were all
based on one legal or remedial theory." Id. at 826. On appeal of the denial of the class certification
under Rule 23(b)(3), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of the request to certify the
class. Boughton, 65 F.3d at 828.
20 Id. at

828.

2'

65 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1995).

23

Id.

24

Id. at 1194.

The jury did not return a separate verdict form specifically stating what acts and/or omissions
constituted Conefs were negligence. However, the special jury verdicts for medical monitoring
25

reasonable to award money damages for future medical monitoring. However, the jury did award
monetary damages to all eight Boughton plaintiffs; all eight prevailed on their claims of
negligence, six of the plaintiffs prevailed on claims of trespass, and three recovered on their claims
of nuisance.26
After the Boughton trial, a second set of plaintiffs filed a separate lawsuit. These plaintiffs,
the Dodge plaintiffs, filed an amended wmplaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado almost identical to that in the Boughton trial also asserting that Cotter
breached its duty to control the ~ontaminants.~'The Dodge plaintiffs prevailed on their motion for

summaryjudgment on the issues of negligence, trespass, and nui~ance.~'
At the wnclusion of the
Dodge trial, the jury returned verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages for physical

injuries and diminution in property value.29On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded
the case for a new trial.30On remand, the district wurt granted the defendant's motion for

for the individual plaintiffs asked whether Cotter was negligent and the jury found Cotter was
negligent. Dodge, 203 F.3d at 1195.
26 Boughton, 65 F.3d
27

at 825.

Dodge, 203 F.3d at 1195.

*' Their motion was based on the jury verdict from the Boughton trial using the doctrine of nonmutual, offensive collateral estoppel. Id
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit stated that it was not clear as a matter of law that the issues of the
Boughton and Dodge trials were the same. The Dodge plaintiffs' complaint differed because it had
different dates of operation Additionally, because there was no indication of what specific act
formed the basis for the general finding of negligence in Boughton, the wurt stated that the seven
claims pertaining to hazardous releases in Dodge did not "clearly enwmpass[]"the general finding
of negligence of the first trial. Id at 1198.
29

r-\>

30 The wurt stated the district court misapplied the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the
issues in the two cases were not identical. The wurt additionally stated that even if the issues were
identical, the Boughton verdict would not bind the Dodge plaintiffs because the parties had not
agreed to be bound by the bellwether trial results before trial. Id.

summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs claim for damages based on emotional distress caused
/7

by the increased fear of cancer." The Tenth Circuit reviewed this order and agreed that the Dodge
plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof to permit their recovery for emotional distress
damages?' Emotional distress claims related to the fear of cancer caused by emissions of toxic
chemicals are the focus of this paper. Lost chance and enhanced risk will not be addressed.

III.BACKGROUND
Fear of cancer is an emotional distress claim "generally used to describe present anxiety
over developing cancer in the f~ture.'"~
A claim for fear of cancer is most closely related to a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).~~
Originally, only intentional infliction of emotional distress, and not NED,was a

/

-

wmpensable cause of action." Even though N E D is a recognized cause of action, courts are still
reluctant to award emotional damages because they are too speculative in nature.36 Additionally,
the wurts fear that allowing recovery may allow for an increase in the number of fraudulent
claims and allow claims with virtually no evidence to proceed37

i Coloradoprogression of Fear of Cancer Claim

32 Id.

at 1200-02.

"See

Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, 863 P.2d 795 (CA 1993).

34 See

generally id

35

See Cuny v. Journal Pub. Co., 41 N.M. 318,68 P.2d 168 (1937).

36 Towns V.

\ '-,

"Id

Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Colo. 1978).

at 1 164.

In Colorado, three cases show the progression in the law regarding emotional distress. In
A

Towns v. ~nderson.~*
the court abolished the impact requirement for cases of negligent infliction

of emotional distress. In that case, the mother brought an action to recover on behalf of her son for
emotional, psychological, and psychiatric injuries resulting from the destruction of the family's
home. The son was standing away from the house when a gas explosion lifted the house off its
foundation and caught fire.39The son heard the screams of his sister who was inside the house at
the time of the explosion. The son was not physically injured, but suffered from numerous
physical problems including sleepwalking, nightmares, and ner~ousness.~
The trial court
dismissed the action because the son did not exhibit any physical impact or manifestation at the
scene of the accident. The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and adopted the
~estatement~'
approach stating that there have been medical advances allowing for a more
accurate diagnosis of emotional and mental injuries creating sufficiently reliable information on
,PA

which to base a decision.42
The second case cited by the Colorado court more closely resembles the facts of Dodge. In
Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber ~ o r n p a n the
y~~
court held that the plaintiffs could not recover

38

579 P.2d 1163 (Colo. 1978).

40 Id.

41 Restatement (Second)

of Torts S436A. If the negligence of one, the tortfeasor, creates an
unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm or emotional distress to another, but does not manifest
itself in a physical injury or other compensable damage, the tortfeasor is not liable for the
emotional distress. Physical injury can be manifested by prolonged headaches, repeated hysterical
attacks, and nausea. If however, there is an immediate emotional response to the negligent
conduct, not manifested by a physical condition, the tortfeasor is not protected from liability.

,p.

43

863 P.2d 795 (CA 1993).

for emotional distress caused by fear of cancer." The plaintiffs were four landowners who lived
A

next to a landfill where the defendant had a practice of disposing toxic wa~tes.~'
The toxins46
eventually contaminated the plaintiffs' water wells.47None of the plaintiffs were suffering from
cancer or a precancerous condition, but all had an increased and unquantified risk of developing
cancer from the exposure to the toxins in the landfil~."~
The court addressed immune system
impairment andlor cellular damage as a parasitic

as well as the non-parasitic emotional

di~tress.'~
The court stated that absent an express exception, damages for fear of cancer might be
recovered if the plaintiff proves that:
1) as a result of the defendant's negligent breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff, the
plaintiff is exposed to a toxic substance which threatens cancer;and 2) the
plaintiffs fear stems from a knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical or
scientific opinion, that it is more likely than not that the plaintiffwill develop the
cancer in the future due to the toxic e~posure.~'
Under this rule, knowledge of possible exposure and a significant increased risk of cancer are
p'

insufficient to support a claim of emotional distre~s.'~
Plaintiffs must show, corroborated by either
"Potter, 863 P.2d at 816.

"'

The toxins included benzene, toluene, chlorofonn, 1,l-dichloroethene, methylene chloride,
tetrachloreoethene, I,l,l-trichloroethane, trichloroethene, and vinyl chloride. All are suspected
carcinogens, but vinyl chloride and benzene are known carcinogens. Potter, 863 P.2d at 801-02.
47 id. at

49

801.

id at 806-07. A parasitic emotional distress claim is one that is attached to a physical injury.

Id at 807-17. A non-parasitic emotional distress claim is one that is not attached to a physical
injury.
" Id
P.

at 816.

"Potter, 863 P.2d at 816.

scientific or medical opinion, that they harbor a serious fear that the exposure of a toxin "was of

n

such magnitude and proportion'*3 that there is a "significant chancews4they will develop cancer in
the future.s5The court provided multiple policy reasons for limiting the availability of recovery for
fear of cancer. First, the wurt stated everyone is exposed to carcinogens every day and is a
potential fear-of- cancer plaintiff:6 potentially creating huge class actions that could put a
tremendous burden on society.s7 Second, it could have a detrimental impact on the health care
field because access to prescription drugs would be impeded.58Third, the recovery for fear of
cancer could impede rewvery of those that do sustain physical injury.59The plaintiffs with a
physical injury may not recover completely because defendants and insurers may not have
adequate

resource^.^' Fourth, requiring a higher threshold would encourage more consistent

~erdicts.~'

r-"
s3 Id.
54

While the language of "significant chance" used to clarify the standard by the court is
inconsistent with the "more likely than not" standard enumerated by the court, there is no
indication that the court intended two tests. Id

ss Id
56 Potter,

863 P.2d at 812.

57 Id.

'*Id The amicus curiae California Medical Association stated that thousands of drugs having no
known side effects are being used and the harmful effects of these drugs may not be known for
years. If there were harmful effects, the numerous lawsuits, which could result, would be
unlimited. Id.

The final case the Colorado courts used in developing the standard for fear of cancer was,
Boryla v. ~ r n h . ~
In*that case, the plaintiff suffered from invasive breast cancer. The plaintiff had
extensive surgery and had not had a reoccurrence of cancer since the operation. The plaintiff sued
the doctor for negligent diagnosis and stated the delay in diagnosing her condition resulted in an
increased amount of cancer cells in her body; she was allowed to recover for her fear of cancer.63
This was not a case about an increased risk of cancer, but a claim for emotional distress including
a fear of reoccurrence of cancer.@This court did not adopt the "more probable than not" standard
set forth in

The court stated that when a physical injury already exists, the standard does

not apply because the damages are not purely emotional in nature.66This case is unlike a toxic tort
case and thus the rationales are not the same. A toxic tort case rationale is not present because the
class of plaintiffs is limited to the parties in dispute and by not adopting the standard annunciated
in Potter, it would not equate to inconsistent jury verdicts.
P

i

The Tenth Circuit in Dodge did not expand emotional distress recovery to include fear of
cancer resulting from exposure to toxins.67The first step in the court's analysis was to determine
whether the plaintiffs met the threshold requirement set forth in Towns by showing that they were
subjected to an unreasonable risk of bodily harm due to Cotters negligence.68The court then

"Id. at 125.
@

Id at 127.

65 Id. at
66 1d

67

7
.
.

128.

at 128.

Dodge, 203 F.3d at 1202.

id. at 1201.

addressed whether the plaintiffs, like Boryla, suffered from a chronic and continuing physical

A

manife~tation.~~
The court stated the evidence failed to show either of these requirementsm The
Tenth Circuit stated there was no indication by the Colorado Supreme Court that they would
equate the traditional negligence principles used in Boryla, to encompass fear of cancer outside of

a medical malpractice claim.71Even if the court were to expand recovery for emotional distress to
encompass toxic tort cases, the Dodge plaintiffs failed to produce evidence demonstrating they
suffered from a "chronic objective condition caused by their increased risk of developing
can~er."'~
The distinguishing characteristic for the court seemed to be the fact that the Dodge
plaintiffs suffered only from acute physical manifestations whereas the plaintiff in Boyla suffered
from a permanent and objective injury "leading to an increased risk of can~er."'~

ii. New Mexlco Progression of Fear of Cancer Claim
/-

Dodge can be helpful to New Mexico courts when confronted with similar cases which

may originate in New Mexico because of WIPP, Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories,
Intel or from mining and oil production in the Northeastern area of the state.

69 Id.
O
'

Id.

7'

Dodge, 203 F.3d at 1202.

72 Id.
73

A

Id. Even though the Colorado Supreme Court stated in Botyla that it was not an "increased risk
of cancer case," the Tenth Circuit seems to narrow the Colorado Supreme Court's holding to allow
only those that have had cancer in the past and might have cancer in the future to recover for
emotional distress. Id.

The first reported case of emotional distress in New Mexico is Curry v. Journal Pub. ~
A

0

The case analyzed two issues: 1) Does a cause of action exist from negligently spoken words
resulting in damages? and 2) Can damages be recovered for grief resulting in physical injury?75
English common law stated that there was no liability for negligence by spoken words but only
for intentional falsehoods." However, the trend in American courts at the time was to allow a
cause of action if the defendant had an obligation to the plaintiff to use care in making statements
of fact, on which the plaintiff might rely.n Two considerations from the leading cases in
~rnerica~'
guided the Cuny wurt in the decision of this case. First, the wurt stated that a fine line
separates moral obligation from a legal

Legal duties are when the w
urt could find liability

for emotional distress for breach of contract, libel, or slander.80Generally speaking, a moral
obligation crosses over to equate to a legal duty when one individual owes a duty to the other."

74 41 N.M.

318,68 P.2d 168 (1937). The Albuquerque Journal falsely published an obituary of the
former territorial governor and ex-congressman, George Curry; he was alive and well. When
Curry's son read the obituary, it caused him to have a heart attack resulting in permanent
impairment. The daughter-in-law had a similar reaction to the false obituary. She suffered
permanent impairment to her health. The child the daughter-in-law was pregnant with at the time
was also permanently impaired due to the daughter-in-law's shock. Id at 169.
75 Id.

at 169.

78

Jaillet v. Cashman, 115 Misc. 383,189 N.Y.S. 743; Herrick v. Evening Express Publishing Co.,
120 Me. 138,113 A 16,23 A.L.R. 358.

79 Curry, 68 P.2d

at 169-70.

.

~

~

Second, without a physical injury it was not possible to know how to compensate the
victim." The court stepped away from the blanket assertion of not allowing NIED and used the
two principles discussed in the two leading cases in A ~ n e r i c aIn
. ~other
~ words, for a plaintiff to
prevail on a claim for emotional distress, the plaintiff must show: 1) that the defendant should
have realized hidher conduct would have created an unreasonable risk of causing emotional
distress, thus showing a duty between the plaintiff and defendant and 2) that bodily injury or
illness is probable." The Curry court did not intend the principles it set forth to apply generally to
all circumstances and limited their decision to the facts of that case.85The court used these

principles in addition to the standard elements of a claim for negligence.% Requiring the plaintiff
to prove the standard elements of a negligence cause of action will eliminate or ''weed out" the

cases where the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty.87 If the court had focused on proximate
cause instead of the duty owed to the plaintiff, it would have resulted in a flood of litigation
because everyone reading the newspaper on that day could have filed a cause of action for
emotional distress.88

82

Id at 170 citing Spade v. Lynn & B.R Co., 168 Mass. 285,47 N.E.88,38 L.RA. 5 12,60
Am.St.Rep. 393.
83 Curry, 68 P.2d at

171.

Id. at 173.

"

Id at 174 ("Not every negligent act that results in damage to some one is actionable. There must
be a duty owing to the injured by the person whose negligent act inflicts the injury, and such duty
does not extend to the protection of third persons not directly involved... ." citations omitted).

Ramirez v. ~ r m t r o n gexpressly
,~~
overruled ~ u n yand
, ~was
~ the f i t case that addressed

^

whether bystanders could recover for emotional distress in ~ e ~we x i w ? Prior
'
case law had only
addressed intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress
tangentially.* The discussion centered on the following rules from three otherjurisdictions in an
attempt to define liability to bystanders:931) the "impact rule?

2) the "zone of danger" rule?'

and 3) the Dillon rule. % The first two rules focus on the foreseeability of harm and the duty of

100 N.M. 538,673 P.2d 822 (1983), overruled inpart by Folz v. State. 110 N.M 457,797 P.2d
246 (1990). Three children witnessed the death of Santana Ramirez; two were Mr. Ramirez's
children and one was a family friend. Mr. Ramirez's third child heard about the accident. The
court addressed which if any of the children could recover for emotional distress. Id at 538,673
P.2d at 822. All four children claim that they suffer from both physical and mental injury. Id at
540.673 P.2d at 824. The wurt onlv allowed the two children who actuallv witnessed the accident
to recover for emotional distress b&ed on the analysis under the Dillon rufe. See infa n.85.
89

Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 540,673 P.2d at 824.

9,

The "impact rule" restricts claims for emotional iniuries to those plaintiffs who show they
suffered frbm a physical injury. See Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L. Ry ~ dv..Story, 63 Ill. App. 239
(1896).
94

95 The "zone of danger rule" allows recovery for those who are threatened with physical injuries,
which is similar to the discussion in Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E.
99 (1928). See Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541,673 P.2d at 825.

r,

% illo on v. Legg, 77,441 P.2d 912 (1968). The Dillon wurt was one of the first wurts to
recognize a cause of action for bystanders who suffered emotional distress from seeing an accident
that caused severe injury to a loved one. Id at 915,920. In Dillon, the wurt was faced with
determining if both the mother and sister of a child could recover for emotional distress when the
child was killed by a negligent driver. Idat 915. Under the zone of danger rule, the court would
come to a "somewhat revolting" result only allowing the sister to recover and not the mother. Id
at 919 n.4. The Dillon wurt adopted to use general principles of negligence and looked to whether
there was a duty between the plaintiff and the defendant. If a duty existed, determined by
foreseeability, then the plaintiff could recover for emotional distress. Id at 920.

care and deny recovery to bystanders not physically injured.97The Dillon ruleB focuses on the

,n

legally protected interest, which is the latowledge that loved ones are safe.99N E D is a tort against
the integrity of the family.'00By adopting a modified version of the Dillon rule,I0' the courts have
guaranteed recovery for some claimants and at the same time limited the liability of the
defendant.lo2The modified version of Dillon that was adopted in Ramirez requires that:
1) There be a marital, or intimate familial relationship between the victim and the
plaintiff, limited to husband and wife, parent and child, grandparent and grandchild,
brother and sister, and to these persons who occupy a legitimate position in low
parentis; 2) The shock to the plaintiff must be severe, and result from a direct
emotional impact upon the plaintiff caused by the contemporaneous sensory
perception of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident by means
other than contemporaneous sensory perception, or by learning of the accident after
its occurrence; 3)There must be some physical manifestation of, or physical injury
to the plaintiff resulting from the emotional injury; and 4) The accident must result
in physical injury or death to the victim.103
97 Ramirez,

A

100 N.M. at 541,673 P.2d at 825.

The Dillon rule sets forth the following elements in addition to the standard elements of
negligence. First, there must be an intimate marital or familial relationship between the victim and
the plaintiff. Second, the shock to the plaintiff must be severe resulting in a direct emotional
impact on the plaintiff. Additionally, the plaintiff must have a contemporaneous sensory
perception of the accident (not learned of by other means or after the occurrence of the accident).
Id. at 541-42,673 P.2d at 825-26.
98

99 Id.

New Mexico's criteria were much more detailed than the general guidelines originally set forth
by the Dillon court. The court articulated specific relationships between the victim and the
plaintiff that would allow for bystander recovery of NED. The Ramirez court also stated that there
must be a physical manifestation of emotional distress or a physical injury to the plaintiff and the
accident must result in a physical injury or death to the victim. Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541-542,673
P.2d at 825-826. The New Mexico Supreme Court later eliminated the requirement that there be a
physical manifestation of the emotional distress in Folz v. State, 110 N.M 457,797 P.2d 246
(1990).
lo'
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Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541,673 P.2d at 825.

Ramirez has since been ovenuled and New Mexico no longer requires the plaintiff to meet the
A

threshold requirement severe emotional trauma resulting in a physical injury or illness.
Seven years after Ramirez, bystander recovery was addressed again in Folz v. State '04 and
the New Mexico Supreme Court abandoned the impact portion of the modified DiNon rule
previously adopted.lo5Mrs. Folz not only suffered from multiple injuries, but also witnessed her
husband die at the accident and heard the screams of her son asking his father not to die.IMA runaway truck collided with the Folz vehicle killing the husband and son of Dorothy Folz. Mrs. Folz
claimed that negligent traffic control associated with the road construction was the cause of the
accident.'07

In some cases, the requirement of physical injury is over-inclusive and in others, underinclusive.'08This case, unlike the children in Ramirez, Folz was a direct victim of the negligent
tortfeasors and suffered physical injuries; she could have recovered for emotional distress under
/--

the impact requirement articulated in Ramirez.Iw Although the "impact" requirement was not the
controlling issue in Folz, and was e~iminated."~
It was more important to preserve the basic
principles of tort law; the reasonable reactions of real people should not automatically preclude a

Io4

110 N.M. 456,797 P.2d 246 (1990)

'05

Id.at 457,797 P.2d 246.

IM

id. at 468,797 P.2d at 257.

lo'

Id.at 460-61,797 P.2d at 249-50.

'08

id. at 470,797 P.2d at 259.

'09

Folz, 110 N.M. 456,471,797 P.2d 246,260.

'I0

Id. at 456,797 P.2d at 246.

cause of action."' The genuineness of a claim for emotional distress would not be measured by a
, ->

physical manifestation.Il2
Curry, Ramirez, and Folz, however, do not address emotional distress caused by the fear of
contracting a disease. The fear of disease is emotional distress of the person the originating injury
and not that of a bystander."3 In Madrid v. Lincoln County Medical enter,"^ the court held that
public policy supports formulating a cause of action for emotional distress damages for fear that
another's negligence has caused "him or her to contract HIV through a medically sound channel of
transmis~ion.""~It is not necessary that the plaintiff actually contract the disease, so long as the
plaintiff has a fear of contraction for a period of time.'16 Sonia Madrid was transporting medical
samples of blood when one leaked during transport and she was splashed with the contents.'" Her
hands, which were exposed to the contents, had multiple unhealed paper cuts.'18 Medical
professionals told her that she should be tested for the M V virus several times over the next

/-'

'I3

Madrid v. Lincoln County Medical Center, 122 N.M. 269,271,923 P.2d 1154,1157 (1996).

'I4

122 N.M. 269,923 P.2d 1154 (1996).

122 N.M. at 274,923 P.2d at 1159 (1996), citing Williamson v. Waldman, 291 N.J.Super. 600,
677 A.2d 1179, 1180-81 (Ct. App. Div. 1996). The court stated, "where a defendant's negligent
act or omission provides an occasion from which a reasonable apprehension of contracting deadly
disease may eventuate, and where the quality of the conduct is such to create a presumption of
exposure, the resulting claim for damages by reason of emotional injury may not be dismissed on
summary judgment."
'I6

"'Madrid, 122 N.M. at 270,923 P.2d at 1155.
'I8

id

year.119Madrid later found out that the medical sample that had leaked did not contain the Auto
Immune Deficiency (AIDS) virus.'20 The court stated that it was irrelevant that she was not
actually exposed to the virus or that she actually contracted the virus.12' The Medical Center relied
on the Potter court's rationale and stated that allowing recovery in this case would increase the
number of plaintiffs, increase liability insurance premiums, increase the cost of malpractice
insurance, and will create inconsistent results and discourage settlements.122The court rejected this
rationale because, unlike carcinogens, not everyone is exposed to AIDS every day.Iz3
Additionally, the period in which infection of the AIDS virus can be detected is a finite period.'"
Therefore, the period in which someone will have a fear of contracting the disease is also a finite
period. Allowing recovery in this case would not cause a flood of litigation because plaintiffs must
still prove all of the elements of an ordinary negligence case and there must be proof of a
medically sound method of transmission.L25
The requirements of negligence and duty would
reduce the number of incidents.lZ6More importantly, sound public policy supports allowing
claims of emotional distress founded on the fear of disease.

Madrid 122 N.M. at 270,923 P.2d at 1155.

"' Id at 269,923 P.2d at 1154.
"'Id at 275,923 P.2d at 1169.
Id at 277,923 P.2d at 1162.

Id.
Id

Madrid 122 N.M. at 277,923 P.2d at 1162.
P,

'' Id. at 278,932 P.2d at 1163.

One of the functions of the tort

systems is to deter unreasonable conduct. The imposition of liability deters others from repeating
negligent conduct.'28
Even though Madrid addresses the fear of disease, namely AIDS, the New Mexiw
Supreme Court indicated that it is reluctant to recognize an emotional distress claim based on the
fear of cancer.'29 Additionally, a uniform jury instruction has not been drafted because there is
insufficient case law.I3OUnlike AIDS, the fear of cancer can wntinue for an indefinite period.13'
Fear of cancer is a special category of emotional distress because there is not a defined period after
exposure to a toxin that a medical professional can determine with absolute certainty that the
person has or will contract cancer. The court stated that potential class size and the underlying
policy would determine whether a cause of action for N E D for fear of cancer would be
acknowledged in New ~ e x i w . ' ~ ~
Both New Mexico and Colorado use Pofter as precedent to determine whether to award
, ,nt

damages for fear of disease. One of the requirements in Potter was that the plaintiff had
knowledge of a reasonable likelihood, supported by medical proof, they would contract a
di~ease."~
In other words, there must be a medical probability that the plaintiff would contract a
disease.

12'

id at 277,923 P.2d at 1162.
Id

I3O

N.M.R. Civ. UJI 13-1630 (Supp. 2001).
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Madrid, 122 N.M. 277,923 P.2d at 1162.
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See supra n.5 1 .

Unlike Boryla where the plaintiff had already contracted cancer and there was a medical

*

probability, but not a certainty, that she would wntract cancer agaiqn4 the Dodge wurt did not
allow recovery for the fear of cancer. There was insufficient scientific and medical evidence to
support a fmding that the plaintiffs would eventually contract cancer. The Madrid court stated it
would be reluctant to award damages for fear of cancerI3' for reasons similar to those reasons in
Dodge. The medical probability in Boryla can be equated to the medical probability of contracting

HIV through a sound method of transmission in Madrid. By equating "medical probability" to
"sound method of transmission," it is reasonable that the New Mexico courts would allow for fear
of cancer claims if the plaintiff was in remission.
Even with the possibility that New Mexiw courts would allow for fear of cancer claims in
some cases, it is unlikely that the courts would allow claims for fear of cancer from toxic
exposure. Like Dodge, without significant evidence showing that there is a probability that
rP'.

plaintiffs will contract cancer, the court indicates that fears from toxic exposure are too
speculative.

N.ANALYSIS & IMPLICATIONS
By abolishing the impact requirement of the Dillon rule, like the Colorado courts, the New
Mexiw courts have opened the door for more claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
However, this does not automatically open the door to recovery for all fear of cancer claims.
The potential for a large number of victims is a deterrent in allowing recover for emotional
distress caused by the fear of disease. In order to limit the class size, the New Mexiw wurts have

'34

See supra n.73.

"'See supra n.128.

stated that it will look to the method of t r a n s m i ~ s i o aUnlike
' ~ ~ HIV, there is not one channel of
>-,

transmission for cancer. Numerous causes of cancer are still unknown and therefore this method of
limiting class size probably will most likely eliminate all claims for fear of cancer. The "method of
transmission" for the previously mentioned chemicals can be inhalation, ingestion, or exposure to
the chemical by absorption through the skin.'37 Cancer is a disease of the blood or tissue that
usually manifests itself in a genetic mutation of the cellular structure and is not passed from one
individual to another."' However, if "medical probability" can be equated to "method of
transmission" some plaintiffs would be allowed to recover, but the potential class size would be
limited. In a case of toxic exposure, the medical probability decreases as the distance increases
from the contamination site to the location of the plaintiff. Therefore, the possible class size could
be limited by geographic area
The Madrid court required that the plaintiffs prove all elements of an ordinary negligence

I",

case. In this case, the plaintiff must prove that the toxin was negligently released by the defendant,
the toxin is a known carcinogen, and that the release of the toxin caused the fear of cancer.
Causation and duty are obstacles that the plaintiff must overcome. The plaintiff must be aware that
the toxin was released, show that the toxin is a cause of cancer, and prove that hetshe had an actual

13'

122 N.M. 269 at 278,923 P.2d at 1154 (1996).

In addition to the chemicals previously noted, see supra n.38, uranium is another known cause
of cancer. Recently, Congress has passed legislation, the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of
1990, to compensate individuals and their families who worked in uranium mines and uranium
processing plants. The United States government either failed to inform the workers of the risk of
working with uranium or failed to protect the workers from the hazardous materials. Whrle the
compensation has benefited many, the scope of the compensation act leaves numerous families
and workers without any compensation. This act has since be amended and now includes a larger
group. Southwest Research and Information Center, available at
http://www.sric.orglminingldocs/RECA.html(last visited June 3,2002).
13'

13'

Webster's Concise English Dictionary 64 (1992).

fear and that the toxin was the cause of the fear. The proof of negligence in such a case will rely
heavily on scientific experts. However, as the Dodge and Boughton courts have stated, that even
with expert testimony, the actual amount of exposure can not be conclusively stated or even
estimated with reasonable certainty. Additionally, the amount of exposure has different effects on
different people depending on many variables including age and the initial health of the person.
The requirement that the plaintiff must meet all of the negligence criteria taking into account these
variables will limit the class size.
By requiring the plaintiff to prove the ordinary elements of negligence, the number of
emotional distress cases brought which have resulted from a toxic chemical release would be
limited. Negligence is one of the most developed areas of law in New Mexico and provides
options for the plaintiff when proving the elements of negligence. For example, the causation
requirement can be changed from a "but for" analysis to a "substantial factor" analysis. Another
,"-.

possibility is to change the theory from fear of cancer to alteration of the cellular structure of the
plaintiff: "flipping of switches." While this may be harder to prove, it allows the plaintiff to show
an actual injury. Although no longer required by the court to recover for emotional distress, it
provides evidence showing the extent of emotional distress.
An alternative to failing under the speculative fear of cancer claim for the plaintiff is to

wait and see if cancer develops and then bring the law suit. The problem with this method is the
statute of limitations. When does it start? How long is it? Can it be tolled? How do you stop it?
The statute of limitations is four years in New Mexico for a negligence cause of action. However,
it is hard to state when the statute of limitation begins. Does the statute of limitations begin when
the release actually happened, when the plaintiff was exposed to the chemical, when the plaintiff
realized they were exposed to the chemical, or when they developed the fear of cancer?

Another possibility is to bring two lawsuits: one for medical surveillance, negligent release

n

of toxins, etc. and a second when the cancer actual manifests. The statute of limitations is also a
consideration in this senario. If the plaintiff can get around the statute of limitations, the main
problem is whether the second lawsuit will be precluded by one of the preclusion doctrines,
specifically issue and claim preclusion Res judicata, or claim preclusion, can prevent the second
cause of action if the plaintiff loses their claim in the first action.'39 Collateral estoppel, or issue
preclusion, can also prevent a second cause of action.14' For example, if a single plaintiff files suit
and does not recover for negligent infliction of cancer or the fear of cancer and then a second
plaintiff develops cancer and tries to bring a suit, the second plaintiffs suit against the same
defendant will be precluded. Dodge plaintiffs were made abundantly clear of the possibility of
preclusion because the Tenth Circuit found that in addition to meeting the requirements for the
application of collateral estoppel the Dodge plaintiffs would not be bound by the previous results,

r'
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The traditional requirements of res judicata are 1) there must have been prior litigation in which
"identical" claims were raise or could have been raised, 2) the parties in he second litigation must
be in privity, 3) there must be a final judgment, and 4) the judgment must be on the merits. In
determining whether the claim is identical, the court looks to the time, origin, motivation, and
geographic space in which the claim arises from. Steven Baicker-McKee, William M. Janssen, &
John B. Corr, A Student's Guide to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 80-1 (3rd ed. 2000).
I4O The traditional requirements of collateral estoppel are 1) the parties are the same or are in
privity with the original parties (mutuality), 2) the cause of action is different, 3) the issue or fact
was actually litigatedI4O, and 4) the issue was necessarily determined on the merits. The
requirement of mutuality requires that the parties in the first lawsuit be the same as or in privity
with the parties in the second lawsuit in order for collateral estoppel to apply. Additionally,
collateral estoppel initially was only available to defendants as a defensive tactic. Some courts,
including the federal courts and New Mexico courts, have switched from the traditional collateral
estoppel to a modem approach, whch no longer requires the element of mutuality. The modem
rule now states that not all of the parties need to be the same in the two lawsuits as long as the
party against whom collateral estoppel is to be used was a party or was in privity with the party in
the first lawsuit and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first lawsuit.
Restatements (Second) Judgments $27 (1982); See Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472,476,745 P.2d
380,384 (1987).
,-;

unless they had agreed to be bound prior to the bellwether trial."" The Tenth Circuit stated, "[i]f
the parties intended to bind subsequent litigation with the results of prior test trials, the record
must clearly memorialize that agreement. Their failure to do that here leaves important substantive
rights at the mercy of trial tactics."'42
The most important analysis for acknowledging an emotional distress cause of action is
public policy. Madrid stated that the requirement of negligence would reduce the number of
claims and reduce the incidents of negligent b e h a ~ i 0 r . By
I ~ ~allocating economic losses, allowing
for recovery for emotional distress, courts will be deterring companies and individuals from
negligently disposing of waste products. Society through incentives and disincentives encourages
reasonable conduct to limit public exposure from harm and disincentives promote public health.'"
Looking to the type of behavior society should promote based on the industries in New
Mexico, the courts should not follow the results from Dodge. Public policy would indicate that if
the elements of negligence are met and there is evidence that the plaintiffs were exposed to a level
of toxins known to cause cancer or other disease, the plaintiffs should recover for fear of cancer.
Allowing for fear of cancer caused by the exposure to toxins would be a liberal reading of the
Madrid opinion and would equate "medical probability" to "method of transmission."

V. CONCLUSIONS
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Dodge, 203 F.3d at 1200.
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Id.
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Madrid, 122 N.M. at 277,923 P.2d at 1162.

The United States has seen relatively few toxic tort cases, but will most likely be seeing
more in the future with increasing industry, experimentation and discovery of Superfund sites
around the United States. In New Mexico, there is a great chance of widespread fear from
chemical exposure due to WET, two national laboratories, and multiple industries relying on very
toxic chemicals for the manufacturing of their products.
The trend in New Mexico is heading toward allowing fear of cancer causes of action, but
not for toxic exposure. The first case brought for a fear of a disease not caused by a defined
method of transmission like AIDS will set the pace for other emotional distress claims for fear of
disease. That case will be a giant step in the development in tort law because it will have to
address the possibility of a large number of plaintiffs and the skepticism involved with awarding
damages to an injury which may not have any concrete evidence of its existence. The possible
class size, while administratively hard to deal with, can be managed through the rules of civil
.

procedure. Medical diagnosis has improved significantly which will aid with proving the plaintiff
had a reasonable fear. However, the availability of scientific proof on how cancer is transmitted
and what level of exposure is required to cause cancer, is imprecise at best. Dose calculations and
calculations to determine the amount of chemical emissions are educated guesses. It is possible
given the imprecise and invasive nature of contraction of cancer, there is a great possibility for
large monetary verdicts. Because of this possibility, the legislature should consider putting a cap
on the available damages like medical malpractice or the Tort Claims Act. If Dodge is not
followed and without a cap on damages, there is a possibility of bankrupting New Mexico
industries.
New Mexico courts should not follow the results of Dodge and should read Madrid
liberally to allow for fear of cancer caused by toxic exposure but at the same time limit the amount

of damages. By doing this, it will encourage defendants to be carell in the use and disposal of
chemicals at the same time protecting defendants from economic harm.

